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It is common these days to distinguish between three kinds of cognitive 
science or artificial intelligence: classical, connectionist, and (something like) 
embodied-embedded. Of course, all such attempts at neat-and-tidy 
categorization are undoubtedly guilty of over-simplification in one way or 
another. For example, researchers sometimes build models that combine 
aspects of more than one approach (e.g. when conventional connectionist 
networks are used as control systems for embodied agents). That noted, 
however, one method for separating out our three kinds of cognitive science, 
so as to understand more clearly their basic theoretical commitments, would 
be to identify, in a very general way, the sorts of machine that each takes to 
capture the fundamental character of intelligence. If we adopt this strategy, 
classicism will be defined by the manipulation of symbols using structure-
sensitive processes, connectionism by unfolding patterns of activity in 
neurally inspired networks of simple processing units, and embodied-
embedded thinking by complete autonomous robots engaged in perceptually 
guided motor activity. One of the many fascinating claims in Harry Halpin’s 
strikingly original article “Philosophical Engineering: Towards a Philosophy 
of the Web” (Halpin 2008) is that the Web constitutes a fourth conceptual 
anchor for the notion of mind as machine. Halpin’s view, in short, is that the 
Web provides a general model of a computational machine that compels us to 
rethink the notion of representation, while simultaneously radicalizing our 
conception of cognition through a vindication of the idea that minds may be 
realized partly by factors located beyond the skin. In this comment on 
Halpin’s article, I shall engage briefly with just some of the issues that 
confront us once we take this fourth way. 
 
With apologies for the immediate whiff of self-centredness, I shall begin by 
considering an argument from Halpin’s paper that responds explicitly to 
some of my own previous work. I have been known to claim (e.g. Wheeler 
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2005) that any adequate account of representational explanation in cognitive 
science must have the consequence that while certain inner (within-the-skin) 
elements count as representations, most external (beyond-the-skin) elements 
don’t. The justification for this restriction is largely methodological: it seems 
likely that neural states and processes do something that is, for the most part, 
psychologically distinctive, and we expect the concept of representation to 
help us explain how that something comes about. Thus the constraint at issue 
may be specified more carefully as what I call the neural assumption. The 
neural assumption states that if intelligent action is to be explained in 
representational terms, then whatever criteria are proposed as sufficient 
conditions for representation-hood, they should not be satisfied by any extra-
neural elements for which it would be unreasonable, extravagant, or 
explanatorily inefficacious to claim that the contribution to intelligent action 
made by those elements is representational in character. For if such 
illegitimate external factors qualified as representations, the claim that some 
neural state has a representational character would fail to single out what was 
special about the causal contribution to intelligent behaviour made by that 
state. Notice that the neural assumption, as formulated, is liberal enough to 
allow some external factors to qualify as representations in the sense that is 
relevant for cognitive-scientific explanation. However, it is clear that 
representations construed this way will remain largely inside the head.  
 
Halpin distances himself from this approach to representation, arguing that 
once our intellectual goal becomes a philosophy of the Web, as opposed to a 
philosophical account of how representation figures as an explanatory 
primitive in cognitive science, any inner-focused account of representation 
(such as my own) will fail to deliver what theory demands. As he puts it, the 
Web is “nothing if not a robustly representational system, and a large amount 
of research on the Web focuses on how to enable increasingly powerful and 
flexible forms of representations” (Halpin 2008, p.6). Thus “[w]hat we need is 
a notion of what a representation is, a definition that applies to both 
“internal” and “external” representations, not conditions for a 
representational explanation in cognitive science” (Halpin 2008, p.7). In other 
words, what a philosophy of the Web requires is a suitably generic, 
locationally uncommitted account of representation that, in principle, applies 
equally to internal representations (those located within the skin) and external 
representations (those located outside the skin, such as those on the Web). 
Without such an account, we will be unable to make sense of the Web as a 
representational system. In the light of this analysis, Halpin proceeds to 
sketch a proposal for what it is for something to be a representation. Here he 
draws, in part, on Smith’s (1996) notion of representation via registration, 
according to which the distinction between subject and object, and thereby 
between representation and represented, emerges from the dynamics of 
 3 
certain physical processes in which one region of space-time tracks the 
behaviour of another. 
 
I will be concerned not with the plausibility of Halpin’s positive proposal, but 
rather with the alleged need for any unitary, locationally uncommitted 
account of representation. For it seems to me that, from the present 
perspective, although we need a concept of representation that illuminates the 
character of representational explanation in cognitive science, plus a concept 
of representation that makes sense of external representations (and thereby of 
the Web as a representational system), there is no reason to think that it must 
be the same concept of representation in both cases. Indeed, there are 
considerations which suggest that theoretically significant differences are to 
be expected. For example, when external representations are used to guide 
intelligent behaviour, they do so via perception-action loops. Thus consider 
familiar cases of visual maps, whether paper or electronic. Such 
representations are able to direct behaviour because the agent looks at and 
performs an embodied spatial manipulation of the map-realizing elements (the 
atlas or the PDA). No such perception-action engagement with the behaviour-
guiding representations are present when we use neurally realized internal 
maps (assuming there are such things) to navigate around the world. One 
might expect these sorts of differences to have an impact upon the nature of 
the representations in question. Moreover, Halpin himself identifies certain 
principles that (he argues) not only characterize the external representations 
used by the Web, but also perhaps explain the intelligence-facilitating effects 
of the Web. It is hard to see how these principles (universality, inconsistency, 
self-description, least power and the open world – see Halpin 2008, p.9, for 
the details) apply to neural representations.  
 
Of course, given this pattern of divergence, we need some reason to conclude 
that what we call internal representations and what we call external 
representations are both genuine members of some overarching category of 
representational elements. For this, however, it is sufficient that (a) the 
alternative notions be linked by the vague pre-theoretical thought that, to be a 
representation, a state or process should play some sort of standing-in-for 
function, and (b) there should be some sort of family resemblance structure in 
play. Evidence for (b) may be found in the observation that familiar cases of 
external representations (e.g. mathematical symbols) plausibly share certain 
properties with neural representations, properties such as multiple 
realizability and being the bearers of consumed information. 
 
That said, Halpin’s nervousness about my inner-focussed account of 
representational explanation in cognitive science may have an alternative 
source. To see this, we need to plug in the relationship that, according to 
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Halpin, exists between the external representationalism of the Web and (what 
is sometimes called) the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998). 
In general terms, those who believe in the extended mind hold that there are 
conditions under which cognitive states, processes, mechanisms, architecture, 
and so on may be partly realized by material elements located beyond the 
skin. Halpin’s view is that the universal information space of the Web 
supplies a dynamic and open-ended suite of such elements. In other words, 
the ways in which we store, retrieve, manipulate and transform 
representational structures on the Web mean that, under certain conditions, 
some of our cognitive traits are partly realized by those structures. Dramatic 
examples of such cognitive extension occur when multiple agents remotely 
access and update a shared map on the Web. In such cases, the “active 
manipulation of a representation lets [the two agents] partially share a 
dynamic cognitive state and collaborate for their greater collective success… 
via shared external representations that are universally accessible over the 
Web” (Halpin 2008, p.8).  
 
This changes things. If we are to make sense of the Web not only as a 
representational system, but as a representational system whose elements 
may sometimes constitute part of an agent’s cognitive architecture, then one 
might think that the pressure in the direction of a unitary account of 
representation increases. After all, given that certain representational 
structures on the Web are now to be granted cognitive status, it seems that an 
adequate account of representational explanation in cognitive science will need 
to apply not only to familiar inner elements such as neural states and 
processes, but also to those external structures. In other words, any purely 
inner-focused account of representation is now revealed as failing to deliver 
what cognitive theory demands. Although, to my mind, Halpin himself does 
not clearly separate out the present argument from the one with which we 
began (which doesn’t turn on the putatively cognitive status of the external 
representational structures), it seems to be the present argument that offers 
the more compelling case for the view that we need a unitary, locationally 
uncommitted account of representation.  
 
Halpin’s analysis alerts us to the fact that once the idea of cognitive extension 
is on the table, the neural assumption (see above) needs to be separated out 
from what we might now dub the global adequacy requirement – the demand 
that we develop an account of representation suitable for the task of 
cognitive-scientific explanation. The latter is what Halpin (2008, p.7) calls the 
“conditions for a representational explanation in cognitive science”. In my 
previous work I have been guilty of running together the global adequacy 
requirement and the neural assumption (as indicated by the discussion of the 
neural assumption included above). Once we pull these analytical structures 
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apart, however, we can see that the strategy of appealing to different notions 
of representation – the strategy that, as we saw, made sense of external 
representation under a non-cognitive interpretation – will also make sense of 
external representation under a cognitive interpretation. To see why this is, 
notice first that, depending on how one carves up nature into cognitive and 
non-cognitive regions, an account of representation that meets the neural 
assumption may not meet the global adequacy requirement. Consider: if 
externally located representations on the Web figure as genuine parts of 
cognitive processes, the global adequacy requirement will not be met by an 
account of representation that respects the neural assumption – or at least not 
by that account on its own. But that, of course, is the key point. For the global 
adequacy requirement may be met by a varied explanatory toolkit 
encompassing different notions of representation designed for different 
explanatory tasks, such as understanding how neural states contribute to 
intelligent behaviour, and illuminating how external representations may 
figure as genuine parts of cognitive processes. What this suggests is that, with 
the extended mind added to the mix, and the concept of cognitive 
representational space expanded to include external structures, that space 
may reflect the same pattern of similarities and differences between internal 
and external representations that we identified earlier. Thus, even under a 
cognitive interpretation, the unitary notion of representation that Halpin 
seeks may be no more than a philosophical chimera.  
 
So far, I have been assuming that Halpin is right that, under certain 
circumstances, the Web forms part of our cognitive resources. I now want to 
interrogate that idea – not, I hasten to add, because I think it’s obviously 
wrong, but because we need to be clear about what a good argument for that 
conclusion would look like. The first thing to note here is that the extended 
mind hypothesis is a view about the whereabouts of mind that is distinct not 
only from the position adopted by orthodox cognitive science (classical or 
connectionist), but also from the position adopted by any merely embodied-
embedded view. To illustrate this point, we can adapt an example originally 
due to Rumelhart et al. (1986). Most of us solve difficult multiplication 
problems using pen and paper. The pen and paper system is a beyond-the-
skin factor that helps to transform a difficult cognitive problem into a set of 
simpler ones, and to temporarily store the results of intermediate calculations. 
For orthodox cognitive scientists and for supporters of the merely embodied-
embedded view, that pen and paper system is to be conceived as a non-
cognitive environmental prop. It is an external tool that aids certain cognitive 
processes via embodied interaction, but is not itself a proper part of those 
processes. Of course, orthodox cognitive scientists and embodied-embedded 
theorists differ on how best to characterize the interactive arrangement of 
skin-side cognitive processes and external prop. In particular, the embodied-
 6 
embedded theorist is likely to count the bodily activity involved as itself a 
cognitive process, as opposed to a mere output of neurally located cognition, 
and to trace rather less of the source of the manifest complexity of the 
observed behaviour to the brain, and rather more to the structured embodied 
interactions with the external pen and paper system. For all that, however, 
both of these camps think of cognition as a resolutely skin-side phenomenon. 
By contrast, the extended mind theorist considers the causally coupled 
combination of pen-and-paper resource, appropriate bodily manipulations, 
and in-the-head processing to be a cognitive system in its own right. We can 
now pinpoint the right question to ask: does Halpin’s analysis indicate that 
certain manipulations of the Web’s universal information space constitute 
genuine cases of cognitive extension rather than merely embodied-embedded 
intelligence?  
 
Halpin sometimes seem to suggest that cognitive extension results whenever 
an adaptive causal coupling between inner and outer elements produces an 
intelligent outcome. Thus recall his example of two agents whose intelligent 
behaviour is structured by shared remote access, via mobile telephones, to a 
web page containing a map. He implies that coupling considerations are 
sufficient for cognitive extension when he writes that “[s]ince [the two agents] 
are sharing the representation and their behavior is normatively successful 
based on its use, [they] can be said to partially share the same cognitive state” 
(Halpin 2008, p.8). A more sophisticated version of the coupling argument for 
cognitive extension emerges during Halpin’s subsequent discussion of the 
ways in which the coupled combination of analogue organic processing with 
external digital computer memory enable human beings to succeed at 
cognitive tasks that are poorly tackled by unaided organic processing. This is 
a particularly striking example of the ways in which human cognition may be 
transformed through the integration of internal processing with external 
props and scaffolds that possess a different range of fundamental properties. 
Unfortunately, however, even given the transformative effects brought about 
by integrated bio-technological couplings, we don’t yet have an argument for 
cognitive extension. As Adams and Aizawa (2008) forcefully point out, all 
coupling-based arguments for cognitive extension are dangerously insensitive 
to a crucial causal-constitutive distinction, that is, to the distinction between 
cognition being merely causally dependent on some factor, and to cognition 
being constituted by, or partly constituted by, that factor. The cognitive 
activities of Halpin’s remote-map-using agents, as well as those of his 
digitally embedded brains, are surely causally dependent on external factors 
in ways to which traditional theorizing in cognitive science has been largely 
oblivious, but that is not enough to secure the cognitive status of those factors.  
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The main alternative to coupling-based arguments for cognitive extension is 
what, in the literature, is known as the parity principle (Clark and Chalmers 
1998). Exactly how one should formulate the parity principle remains a matter 
of some dispute (Clark 2007; Wheeler forthcoming), but the general idea is 
that if there is functional equality with respect to governing behaviour, 
between the causal contribution of certain internal elements and the causal 
contribution of certain external elements, and if the internal elements 
concerned qualify as the proper parts of a cognitive process, then there is no 
good reason to deny equivalent status – that is, cognitive status – to the 
relevant external elements. Halpin (2008, p.8) quotes Clark and Chalmers’ 
original statement of the parity principle, but it is unclear to what extent he 
gives weight to parity considerations as opposed to issues of coupling and 
integration.  However, because the parity principle appeals, at root, to the 
notion of functional equivalence and not mere coupling, it does not run 
roughshod over the causal-constitutive distinction. So provisionally at least, 
the parity-driven case for cognitive extension is on the firmer footing. In 
relation to Halpin’s arguments, this prompts the following question: is it ever 
correct to say that there is functional parity between (i) the causal 
contributions to intelligent behaviour made by those inner factors that qualify 
as cognitive, and (ii) the causal contributions to intelligent behaviour made by 
structures on the Web?  
 
As far as I can tell, the answer to this question depends on the specific criteria 
that one thinks need to be satisfied for a causal contribution to count as 
cognitive, what Adams and Aizawa (2008) call the mark of the cognitive. Such 
criteria are necessary because, in order to deploy the parity principle, one 
must be able to isolate just those functions that inner elements perform that 
mark out their contribution as cognitive (e.g. the functions involved in the 
context sensitive storage and retrieval of information that might plausibly 
define the cognitive trait of memory). It is parity with respect to the 
realization of these particular functional roles that will establish the cognitive 
status of certain external elements. This introduces a complex issue that 
certainly cannot be settled here. It is worth noting, however, that if the 
extended mind theorist adopts a weak or promiscuous enough mark of the 
cognitive, then it will be easy enough to secure the result that cognition is 
extended; but the price of this success will be to welcome into the domain of 
the cognitive all kinds of wildly unlikely cases in a manner that ultimately 
casts doubt on the ability of the proposed mark to latch onto only what might 
be thought of as the proper objects of cognitive science. What this aspect of 
Halpin’s project still needs, it seems, is a mark of the cognitive that allows 
certain external representations on the Web (such as remotely accessible maps 
just as they guide online intelligent behaviour) to count as cognitive, while 
denying that same status to ‘wildly unlikely cases’ (such as books in a home 
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library or standing mobile telephone access to an Internet search engine 
meaning that one might dispositionally believe everything on the Web). Put 
in a more generic way, the problem is to find a path between the dual dangers 
of a kind of disproportionate elitism (excluding from the domain of the 
cognitive certain genuinely cognitive traits, just because they happen to be 
externally located) and a kind of excessive liberality (welcoming in to the 
domain of the cognitive certain unwanted interlopers, as a side-effect of 
making conceptual room for extended cognition). Halpin is not alone in 
facing this problem. Extended mind theorists in general have perhaps failed 
to realize just how much hangs on it. Nevertheless, it is a problem for Halpin, 
and one that, I think, he cannot ignore.     
      
My response to Halpin’s arguments has necessarily been selective. I could 
have written another comment purely on the issues that Halpin explores 
towards the end of his discussion, when he turns his attention to the 
relationship between bio-technological intelligence and the specific case of the 
Semantic Web. What I hope to have made manifest, however, is the rich vein 
of thought that runs through Halpin’s paper. For while the power of the Web 
as a technological innovation is now beyond doubt, the potential power of the 
Web to have a conceptual impact on cognitive science remains under-
appreciated. The second of these contributions is what I have called the fourth 
way, an intellectual path innovatively revealed by Halpin’s article. My critical 
comments here do no more than point to twists and turns that, in my view, 
remain to be navigated as we explore that trail. The fourth way may well be 
the next way.      
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